Working Paper: NBER ID: w26103
Authors: Marika Cabral; Can Cui; Michael Dworsky
Abstract: This paper analyzes the demand for insurance and the potential rationale for coverage mandates in the context of workers’ compensation insurance. Workers’ compensation is a state-regulated insurance program that provides employers with liability protection and employees with defined income and medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries or illnesses. Nearly all states have mandated workers’ compensation insurance coverage; the sole exception is Texas. Using administrative data from the unique voluntary Texas workers’ compensation insurance system, we estimate the demand for workers’ compensation insurance leveraging idiosyncratic regulatory updates to relative premiums across industry-occupation classifications. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that the demand for workers’ compensation coverage is price-sensitive, with a 1% increase in premiums leading to approximately a 0.3% decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and additional data on costs, we analyze potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage through subsidies or a mandate. This analysis suggests that some common market failure justifications for government intervention in insurance markets—adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not be compelling justifications for a mandate in this setting.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H00; I13; I18; J38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| 1% increase in premiums (G52) | decline in coverage (G52) |
| regulatory updates (K23) | changes in premiums (G52) |
| changes in premiums (G52) | decline in coverage (G52) |