Working Paper: NBER ID: w26083
Authors: A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven Shavell
Abstract: The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.
Keywords: deterrence; sentencing; prison; parole; criminal justice
JEL Codes: K14; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| state decisions (H70) | prison time served (K40) |
| prison time served (K40) | crime deterrence (K42) |
| state learns about prisoner's potential gains (H76) | adjust prisoner's sentence (K40) |
| adjust prisoner's sentence (K40) | optimize deterrence (K40) |
| adjust prisoner's sentence (K40) | greater social welfare (D69) |
| social value of information (D83) | justify adjustment of sentences (K40) |
| justification of sentence adjustments (K40) | enhance deterrence strategy (K42) |