Working Paper: NBER ID: w25985
Authors: Michael J. Boskin; Diego J. Perez; Daniel S. Bennett
Abstract: We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H55; H62; H68
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| framing the social security reform issue as a choice between alternatives (H55) | likelihood of voter support (K16) |
| timing of reforms (E69) | voter preferences (K16) |
| intergenerational and intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests (D15) | types of reforms that can gain traction (D72) |
| increasing the representation of young voters (K16) | likelihood of immediate reforms prevailing (P27) |