Working Paper: NBER ID: w25948
Authors: Amalia R. Miller; Ragan Petrie; Carmit Segal
Abstract: This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in the high-prize tournament, but for the same duration in other treatments.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: J16; J22; J33; J44; M52; M55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| workplace competition (J29) | labor supply (J20) |
| tournament pay (J33) | work time (J29) |
| bonus payment (J33) | employer costs (J32) |
| tournament incentives (Z23) | work hours (J22) |
| gender differences (J16) | labor supply responses (J20) |