Expectations, Wage Hikes, and Worker Voice: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Working Paper: NBER ID: w25866

Authors: Achyuta Adhvaryu; Teresa Molina; Anant Nyshadham

Abstract: Hirschman's (1970) seminal thesis that enabling worker “voice” prevents exit from the employment relationship has played a foundational role in labor economics. We provide the first experimental test of this hypothesis in a real-world setting via a randomized controlled trial in Indian garment factories. Just after what proved to be a disappointing wage hike, workers were chosen at random to participate in an anonymous survey in which they were asked for feedback on job conditions, supervisor performance, and overall job satisfaction. Enabling voice in this manner reduced turnover and absenteeism after the hike, particularly for the most disappointed workers.

Keywords: worker voice; turnover; wage hikes; labor economics; field experiment

JEL Codes: C93; J20; J30; M50


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
voice intervention (L96)reduced turnover rates (J63)
wage disappointment (J31)increased turnover rates (J63)
voice intervention + wage disappointment (J31)reduced turnover rates (J63)
voice intervention (L96)reduced absenteeism (J22)
wage disappointment (J31)increased absenteeism (J22)

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