Working Paper: NBER ID: w25856
Authors: John Asker; C. Scott Hemphill
Abstract: In this paper we examine exclusion accomplished by a coalition of firms—frequently, a coalition of suppliers and customers—that share the benefits of exclusion. As a particular historical example, we study the Canadian sugar industry of the 1880s, which was controlled by a complex coalition of refiners and wholesalers. We assess the incentives and conduct of the parties as revealed in the records of a House of Commons inquiry into anticompetitive practices in the industry. Drawing upon this example, we identify and evaluate several doctrinal approaches to establishing antitrust liability for anticompetitive exclusionary coalitions.
Keywords: exclusionary coalitions; antitrust; Canadian sugar industry; competition law
JEL Codes: D43; K21; L40; L41; L42; N81
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| competitors collude to exclude rivals (L12) | exclusion of rivals (L12) |
| exclusion facilitates collusion among competitors (L12) | collusion among competitors (L12) |
| wholesalers' commitment to refiners (L14) | reduced competition from potential entrants (L19) |
| refiners' agreements to charge higher prices to non-members (L49) | credible threat of exclusion against retailers (L81) |
| mutual benefit from exclusion (F55) | enhanced market control (D47) |
| exclusion (Y60) | limited competition (L13) |