Working Paper: NBER ID: w25800
Authors: Judd B. Kessler; Corinne Low; Colin Sullivan
Abstract: We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.
Keywords: Employer Preferences; Labor Markets; Discrimination; Resume Audit Studies; Experimental Economics
JEL Codes: C90; J24; J71
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| GPA (C00) | hiring interest (J23) |
| internship quality (J24) | hiring interest (J23) |
| demographic characteristics (J21) | perceived likelihood of acceptance (D81) |
| employer preferences (M51) | candidate characteristics (D79) |
| IRR method (H20) | employer preferences (M51) |