Working Paper: NBER ID: w25716
Authors: Christian Dippel; Michael Poyker
Abstract: Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront.
Keywords: judge elections; electoral sentencing cycles
JEL Codes: D72; H76; K41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| competitiveness of judicial elections (K16) | length of sentences (Y60) |
| absence of competitive electoral conditions (D72) | no significant change in sentencing (K40) |
| electoral rules and donor activity (K16) | strength of sentencing cycles (K14) |