Working Paper: NBER ID: w25654
Authors: Sylvain Chassang; Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Juan M. Ortner
Abstract: We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids.
Keywords: collusion; bidding; regulation; procurement auctions
JEL Codes: C72; D44; H57; L51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| regulatory policies (G18) | collusion (D74) |
| safe tests (C52) | collusion strategies (L12) |
| missing bids (D44) | noncompetitive behavior (C72) |
| density of bids just above winning bid (D44) | missing mass of close losing bids (D44) |
| bidders' incentives to increase bids (D44) | noncompetitive equilibrium (D59) |