Working Paper: NBER ID: w25637
Authors: Luigi Butera; Robert Metcalfe; William Morrison; Dmitry Taubinsky
Abstract: Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride—are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies.
Keywords: Public Recognition; Welfare Effects; Shame; Pride; Social Image Utility
JEL Codes: D8; D9; H0; I0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Performance levels (D29) | Image payoffs from public recognition (M52) |
| Curvature of public recognition utility function (D11) | Sensitivity to negative image payoffs (D91) |
| Population characteristics (J11) | Welfare effects of public recognition (D69) |
| Public recognition (O36) | Increased attendance (I24) |
| Public recognition (O36) | Willingness to pay (WTP) (Q26) |