Blockchain Economics

Working Paper: NBER ID: w25407

Authors: Joseph Abadi; Markus Brunnermeier

Abstract: The fundamental problem in digital record-keeping is to establish consensus on an update to a ledger, e.g., a payment. Consensus must be achieved in the presence of faults—situations in which some computers are offline or fail to function appropriately. Traditional centralized record-keeping systems rely on trust in a single entity to achieve consensus. Blockchains decentralize record-keeping, dispensing with the need for trust in a single entity, but some instead build a consensus based on the wasteful expenditure of computational resources (proof-of-work). An ideal method of consensus would be tolerant to faults, avoid the waste of computational resources, and be capable of implementing all individually rational transfers of value among agents. We prove a Blockchain Trilemma: any method of consensus, be it centralized or decentralized, must give up (i) fault-tolerance, (ii) resource-efficiency, or (iii) full transferability.

Keywords: Blockchain; Consensus Algorithms; Digital Recordkeeping

JEL Codes: D82; E42; G29


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Consensus algorithm (D70)sacrifice one of three ideal properties (D41)
Lack of trust (D83)necessity of trade-off (D10)
Communication protocol with trusted mediator (D82)achieve all three properties (Z00)
Unmediated consensus algorithm (D70)achieve any two properties (C52)
Absence of trusted mediator (D74)necessity of providing incentives for honest behavior (D82)
Giving up fault-tolerance (G33)detection of dishonest behavior (K42)
Relinquishing resource-efficiency (D61)providing incentives for honesty (M52)
Relinquishing full transferability (F16)providing incentives for honesty (M52)

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