Working Paper: NBER ID: w25205
Authors: Garance Genicot; Laurent Bouton; Micael Castanheira
Abstract: This paper studies the political determinants of inequality in government interventions under the majoritarian and proportional representation systems. Using a model of electoral competition with targetable government intervention and heterogeneous localities, we uncover a novel relative electoral sensitivity effect in majoritarian systems. This effect, which depends on the geographic distribution of voters, can incentivize parties to allocate resources more equally under majoritarian systems than proportional representation systems. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that government interventions are more unequal in majoritarian systems.
Keywords: Electoral Systems; Inequality; Government Interventions
JEL Codes: D72; H00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| geographic distribution of voters (K16) | relative electoral sensitivity effect (D79) |
| relative electoral sensitivity effect (D79) | parties allocate resources more equally across districts (D72) |
| majoritarian systems (D72) | parties allocate resources more equally across districts (D72) |
| majoritarian systems (D72) | horizontal inequality decreases (F63) |
| majoritarian systems (D72) | vertical inequality may reinforce (I24) |
| relative electoral sensitivity effect (D79) | government interventions (H53) |