Working Paper: NBER ID: w25100
Authors: Samuel Bazzi; Sarah Burns; Gordon Hanson; Bryan Roberts; John Whitley
Abstract: Over 2008 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later re-apprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the roll-out of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month re-apprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2%. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.
Keywords: Illegal immigration; Border enforcement; Sanctions; Recidivism
JEL Codes: F22; J61
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| decrease in likelihood of reapprehension (K42) | reduction in attempted illegal entry (F55) |
| exposure to penalties under the consequence delivery system (CDS) (K40) | likelihood of reapprehension (K40) |
| exposure to penalties under the consequence delivery system (CDS) (K40) | 18-month reapprehension rate (Y40) |
| exposure to penalties under the consequence delivery system (CDS) (K40) | decline in recidivism in apprehensions (K42) |