Working Paper: NBER ID: w25024
Authors: Umut M. Dur; Parag A. Pathak; Fei Song; Tayfun Sönmez
Abstract: This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use.
Keywords: Taiwan; high school placement; deduction mechanism; school choice
JEL Codes: D47; I20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Deduction system (H20) | Widespread dissatisfaction (D59) |
| Widespread dissatisfaction (D59) | Public protests (D72) |
| Deduction system (H20) | Perceived unfairness in school placements (I24) |
| Perceived unfairness in school placements (I24) | Public protests (D72) |