Working Paper: NBER ID: w24966
Authors: Adlai Newson; Francesco Trebbi
Abstract: We explore the role of ruling elites in autocratic regimes and provide an assessment of tools useful to clarify the structure of opaque political environments. We first showcase the importance of analyzing autocratic regimes as non-unitary actors by discussing extant work on nondemocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa and China, where the prevailing view of winner-take-all contests can be clearly rejected. We show how specific biographical information about powerful cadres helps shed light upon the composition of the inner circles that empower autocrats. We further provide an application of these methods to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), one of the most personalistic, opaque, and data-poor political regimes in the world today. Employing information from DPRK state media on participants at official state events, we are able to trace the evolution and consolidation of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un around the transition period following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. The internal factional divisions of the DPRK are explored during and after this transition. Final general considerations for the future study of the political economy of development are presented.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: P16; P48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| internal organization of autocratic regimes (D73) | stability of autocratic regimes (O17) |
| distribution of resources among elites (D30) | stability of autocratic regimes (O17) |
| allocation of cabinet positions (D72) | co-opt elites (D70) |
| smaller ethnic groups receiving higher share of cabinet positions (J15) | balance power among competing factions (D72) |
| biographical information about political cadres (D73) | understanding factional dynamics in CCP (D70) |
| elite attendance at state events (Z22) | consolidation of Kim Jong Un's power (L22) |
| personal ties and factional affiliations (D71) | regime stability (C62) |