Working Paper: NBER ID: w24876
Authors: Isaac Mbiti; Karthik Muralidharan; Mauricio Romero; Youdi Schipper; Constantine Manda; Rakesh Rajani
Abstract: We present results from a large-scale randomized experiment across 350 schools in Tanzania that studied the impact of providing schools with (a) unconditional grants, (b) teacher incentives based on student performance, and (c) both of the above. After two years, we find (a) no impact on student test scores from providing school grants, (b) some evidence of positive effects from teacher incentives, and (c) significant positive effects from providing both programs. Most importantly, we find strong evidence of complementarities between the two programs, with the effect of joint provision being significantly greater than the sum of the individual effects. Our results suggest that combining spending on school inputs (which is the default policy) with improved teacher incentives could substantially increase the cost-effectiveness of public spending on education.
Keywords: Education; Tanzania; Randomized Experiment; Teacher Incentives; School Grants
JEL Codes: C93; H52; I21; M52; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Unconditional school grants (I28) | Student test scores (I21) |
| Teacher performance incentives (J33) | Student test scores (I21) |
| Unconditional school grants + Teacher performance incentives (H52) | Student test scores (I21) |
| Unconditional school grants + Teacher performance incentives (H52) | Interaction effect on student test scores (C92) |
| Teacher performance incentives (J33) | Effectiveness of school inputs (I21) |
| Unconditional school grants + Teacher performance incentives (H52) | Cost-effectiveness of education funding (I21) |