How Costly Are Markups

Working Paper: NBER ID: w24800

Authors: Chris Edmond; Virgiliu Midrigan; Daniel Yi Xu

Abstract: We study the welfare costs of markups in a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and endogenously variable markups. We find that the welfare costs of markups are large. We decompose the costs of markups into three channels: (i) an aggregate markup that acts like a uniform output tax, (ii) misallocation of factors of production, and (iii) an inefficiently low rate of entry. We find that the aggregate markup accounts for about two-thirds of the costs, misallocation accounts for about one-third, and the costs due to inefficient entry are negligible. We evaluate simple policies aimed at reducing the costs of markups. Subsidizing entry is not an effective tool in our model: while more competition reduces individual firms' markups it also reallocates market shares towards larger firms and the net effect is that the aggregate markup hardly changes. Size-dependent policies aimed at reducing concentration can reduce the aggregate markup but have the side effect of greatly increasing misallocation and reducing aggregate productivity.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: D04; E02; L14


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
aggregate markup (E10)productivity (O49)
aggregate markup (E10)welfare costs (I30)
markup dispersion (Y60)misallocation of production factors (D24)
size-dependent taxes (H29)markups (D43)
size-dependent taxes (H29)misallocation (D61)
size-dependent taxes (H29)productivity (O49)

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