Working Paper: NBER ID: w24783
Authors: Ernesto Dal B; Frederico Finan
Abstract: We provide a model of self-selection by candidates in a probabilistic voting environment to shed light on the forces shaping the quality of politicians from both the supply and demand sides of politics. The model highlights that the patterns of selection and the comparative statics of politician quality depend critically on how the costs of running for office vary for candidates with different qualities. The model offers predictions on how the quality of the political class will vary with key parameters pertaining to both the supply and demand for candidates. We use the model to frame a review of the empirical literature on political selection that has emerged in the last two decades. We contrast areas where significant progress has been made with others where important theoretical predictions remain untested or existing evidence does not allow a consensus, highlighting areas for future research.
Keywords: Political Selection; Candidate Quality; Probabilistic Voting
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher salaries (J31) | more competent candidates (D79) |
| opportunities for corruption (H57) | lower quality candidates (D79) |
| political competition (D72) | candidate quality (C52) |
| stronger party in competitive districts (D72) | decrease in candidate quality (D79) |
| weaker party in competitive districts (D72) | increase in candidate quality (D79) |
| group size (C92) | candidate quality (C52) |
| larger groups (C92) | higher quality candidates (J24) |
| cost structure of running for office (D72) | candidate quality (C52) |
| constant costs of running for office (K16) | decrease in candidate quality (D79) |
| increasing costs of running for office (K16) | higher quality candidates (J24) |