Working Paper: NBER ID: w24625
Authors: Samuel Bazzi; Matthew Gudgeon
Abstract: This paper argues that redrawing subnational political boundaries can transform ethnic divisions. We use a natural policy experiment in Indonesia to show how the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict depend on the political units within which groups are organized. Redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict, but these gains are undone or even reversed when the new borders introduce greater polarization. These adverse effects of polarization are further amplified around majoritarian elections, consistent with strong incentives to capture new local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redistricting in diverse countries.
Keywords: redistricting; ethnic diversity; conflict; Indonesia; political boundaries
JEL Codes: D72; D74; H41; H77; O12; Q34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Redistricting along ethnic lines (J15) | Reduction in conflict (D74) |
| Redistricting leading to greater polarization (D72) | Increase in conflict (D74) |
| Ethnic polarization (J15) | Increase in conflict (D74) |
| Political boundaries (F55) | Long-run correlation between ethnic polarization and conflict (D74) |
| Redistricting (H77) | Immediate and persistent effects on conflict dynamics (D74) |