Working Paper: NBER ID: w24358
Authors: Bernhard Ganglmair; Timothy Simcoe; Emanuele Tarantino
Abstract: Research productivity depends on the ability to discern whether an idea is promising, and a willingness to abandon the ones that are not. Economists know little about this process, however, because empirical studies of innovation typically begin with a sample of issued patents or published papers that were already selected from a pool of promising ideas. This paper unpacks the idea selection process using a unique dataset from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a voluntary organization that develops protocols for managing Internet infrastructure. For a large sample of IETF proposals, we observe a sequence of decisions to either revise, publish, or abandon the underlying idea, along with changes to the proposal and the demographics of the author team. Using these data, we provide a descriptive analysis of how R&D is conducted within the IETF, and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model whose key parameters measure the speed at which author teams learn whether they have a good (i.e., publishable) idea. The estimates imply that sixty percent of IETF proposals are publishable, but only one-third of the good ideas survive the review process. Author experience and increased attention from the IETF community are associated with faster learning. Finally, we simulate two counterfactual innovation policies: an R&D subsidy and a publication-prize. Subsidies have a larger impact on research output, though prizes perform better when accounting for researchers' opportunity costs.
Keywords: innovation; research productivity; IETF; dynamic discrete choice model
JEL Codes: D83; O31; O32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| author experience (Y70) | faster learning process (C45) |
| community attention (R23) | faster learning process (C45) |
| faster learning process (C45) | decision to revise or abandon proposals (D70) |
| subsidies (H20) | increase in research output (O47) |
| prizes (D44) | effective considering opportunity costs (D61) |
| approximately 60% of IETF proposals (L96) | deemed publishable (Y30) |
| one-third of good ideas (O36) | survive the review process (Y30) |