Working Paper: NBER ID: w24201
Authors: Francesco Decarolis; Leonardo M. Giuffrida; Elisabetta Iossa; Vincenzo Mollisi; Giancarlo Spagnolo
Abstract: Does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.
Keywords: bureaucratic competence; procurement outcomes; public bureaucracy; instrumental variable strategy
JEL Codes: H11; H57; J45
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| bureau competence (D73) | procurement delays (H57) |
| bureau competence (D73) | cost overruns (H72) |
| bureau competence (D73) | number of renegotiations (C78) |
| death events (I12) | bureau competence (D73) |
| bureau competence (D73) | procurement outcomes (H57) |