Working Paper: NBER ID: w24181
Authors: Rebecca Diamond; Timothy McQuade; Franklin Qian
Abstract: We exploit quasi-experimental variation in assignment of rent control to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the overall rental market. Leveraging new data tracking individuals’ migration, we find rent control increased renters’ probabilities of staying at their addresses by nearly 20%. Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase. Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control offered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.
Keywords: Rent Control; Tenants; Landlords; Inequality; San Francisco
JEL Codes: H0; R0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Rent control (R21) | Increased likelihood of renters staying at their addresses (R21) |
| Rent control (R21) | Reduced rental housing supply by landlords (R21) |
| Reduced rental housing supply by landlords (R21) | Citywide rent increase (R21) |
| Rent control (R21) | Increased income inequality in San Francisco (D31) |
| Decreased housing supply (R31) | Welfare losses (D69) |
| Rent control (R21) | Aggregate benefits to tenants (R21) |