Working Paper: NBER ID: w24032
Authors: Monica Martinez-Bravo; Gerard Padró i Miquel; Nancy Qian; Yang Yao
Abstract: We propose a simple informational theory to explain why autocratic regimes introduce local elections. Because citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, delegation of authority via local elections improves selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have no incentive to implement unpopular centrally mandated policies. The model makes several predictions: i) elections pose a trade-off between performance and vertical control; ii) elections improve the selection of officials; and iii) an increase in bureaucratic capacity reduces the desirability of elections for the autocrat. To test (i) and (ii), we collect a large village-level panel dataset from rural China. Consistent with the model, we find that elections improve (weaken) the implementation of popular (unpopular) policies, and improve official selection. We provide a large body of qualitative and descriptive evidence to support (iii). In doing so, we shed light on why the Chinese government has systematically undermined village governments twenty years after they were introduced.
Keywords: Local elections; Autocracy; China; Governance; Bureaucratic capacity
JEL Codes: O1; O2; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of local elections (H70) | Policy outcomes (D78) |
| Local elections (K16) | Selection and performance of local officials for congruent policies (H73) |
| Local elections (K16) | Weakened implementation of unpopular policies (E65) |
| Local elections (K16) | Public goods expenditure (H49) |
| Local elections (K16) | Exemptions granted under one-child policy (J13) |