Working Paper: NBER ID: w23944
Authors: Daniel Treisman
Abstract: How does democracy emerge from authoritarian rule? Influential theories contend that incumbents deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence. Examining the history of all democratizations since 1800, I show that such deliberate choice arguments may help explain up to one third of cases. In about two thirds, democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K00; N20; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Actions of incumbent elites (D72) | Emergence of democratic governance (O17) |
| Mistakes made by incumbents (D79) | Emergence of democratic governance (O17) |
| Calling elections (K16) | Mistakes made by incumbents (D79) |
| Initiating military conflicts (H56) | Mistakes made by incumbents (D79) |
| Loss of elections (K16) | Emergence of democratic governance (O17) |
| Popular uprisings (P39) | Emergence of democratic governance (O17) |
| Failure of limited reforms (P11) | Emergence of democratic governance (O17) |