Working Paper: NBER ID: w23905
Authors: Nathaniel Hilger
Abstract: I describe a new policy that endows firms with limited-duration, virtual shares in their own workers’ future realized earnings growth. The policy seeks to leverage employers to address a key challenge of the modern world: increasing worker skills well into adulthood. I label the policy “generalized experience rating” (GER) because it builds on the more narrow experience rating long embodied in the US unemployment insurance system. GER can be interpreted as a Pigouvian tax, and as a mandate alleviating an adverse selection problem. I discuss many design issues and potential unintended consequences. I conclude the policy may warrant further research.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: J38; J62; J68
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Generalized Experience Rating (GER) policy (H55) | employer investment in worker training and career advancement (J24) |
| Generalized Experience Rating (GER) policy (H55) | moral hazard reduction (G52) |