Working Paper: NBER ID: w23904
Authors: Eoin McGuirk; Nathaniel Hilger; Nicholas Miller
Abstract: We study agency frictions in the United States Congress. We examine the longstanding hypothesis that political elites engage in conflict because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We compare the voting behavior of legislators with draft age sons versus draft age daughters during the conscription-era wars of the 20th century. We estimate that having a draft age son reduces pro-conscription voting by 7-11 percentage points. Support for conscription recovers when a legislator’s son ages out of eligibility. We establish that agency problems contribute to political conflict and that politicians are influenced by private incentives orthogonal to political concerns or ideological preferences.
Keywords: Political Agency; Moral Hazard; Conscription; Legislative Voting
JEL Codes: N42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Having a draft age son (Z22) | Likelihood of voting in favor of conscription (H56) |
| As a legislator's son ages out of draft eligibility (H56) | Likelihood of voting for conscription (H56) |
| Legislators with sons just above the cutoff (J13) | Probability of voting in favor of conscription (H56) |