Working Paper: NBER ID: w23870
Authors: Felipe Barrera-Osorio; David S. Blakeslee; Matthew Hoover; Leigh Linden; Dhushyanth Raju; Stephen P. Ryan
Abstract: We contribute to the school-competition literature by evaluating a program that randomly assigned private schools to underserved villages in Pakistan. Program schools were provided a per-student subsidy to provide tuition-free primary education, with half of the treated villages receiving a higher subsidy for female students. The program increased enrollment by 30 percentage points, and test scores by 0.63 standard deviations. The effects were similar across genders, and across the two subsidy treatments. Program schools were of higher quality than nearby government schools, and a structural model for the supply and demand of school inputs indicates that program schools selected inputs similar to those of a social planner who internalizes all the educational benefits to society.
Keywords: Public-private partnerships; Education; Pakistan; Enrollment; Test scores
JEL Codes: I25; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public-private partnership program (H44) | school enrollment for children aged 6-10 (I21) |
| public-private partnership program (H44) | school enrollment for children aged 11-17 (I21) |
| public-private partnership program (H44) | total test scores (C12) |
| program schools (I23) | educational outcomes (I26) |