Working Paper: NBER ID: w23627
Authors: Rudi Bekkers; Christian Catalini; Arianna Martinelli; Cesare Righi; Timothy Simcoe
Abstract: Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) require participants to disclose patents that might be infringed by implementing a proposed standard, and commit to license their “essential” patents on terms that are at least fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Data from these SSO intellectual property disclosures have been used in academic studies to provide a window into the standard setting process, and in legal proceedings to assess the relative contribution of different parties to a standard. We develop a simple model of the disclosure process to illustrate the link between SSO rules and patent-holder incentives, and examine the model's core predictions using a novel dataset constructed from the disclosure archives of thirteen major SSOs. The central message of the paper is that subtle differences in the rules used by different SSOs can influence which patents are disclosed, the terms of licensing commitments, and ultimately long-run citation and litigation rates for the underlying patents.
Keywords: SSOs; patent disclosure; licensing commitments; essential patents; intellectual property
JEL Codes: D22; K21; L15; L17; L24; L63
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| SSO rules (C20) | patent disclosures (O34) |
| patent disclosures (O34) | citation outcomes (A14) |
| patent disclosures (O34) | litigation outcomes (K41) |
| royalty-free commitments (L17) | self-citations (A14) |
| FRAND commitments (L14) | non-self-citations (Y30) |
| mandatory specific disclosure policies (G38) | forward citations (Y50) |
| disclosure (G14) | litigation rates (K41) |
| upstream licensors (L17) | litigation propensity (K41) |
| downstream implementers (L95) | litigation propensity (K41) |