Towards a Political Theory of the Firm

Working Paper: NBER ID: w23593

Authors: Luigi Zingales

Abstract: Neoclassical theory assumes that firms have no power of fiat any different from ordinary market contracting, thus a fortiori no power to influence the rules of the game. In the real world, firms have such power. I argue that the more firms have market power, the more they have both the ability and the need to gain political power. Thus, market concentration can easily lead to a “Medici vicious circle,” where money is used to get political power and political power is used to make money.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: G3


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Market Power (L11)Political Power (D72)
Political Power (D72)Market Power (L11)
Corporate Power (G38)Political Influence (D72)
Concentration of Corporate Power (L22)Threat to Democratic Processes (D72)
Concentration of Corporate Power (L22)Threat to Economic Prosperity (F52)
Large Corporations (L20)Reduction in Competitive Pressures (L11)

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