Working Paper: NBER ID: w23589
Authors: Gustavo J. Bobonis; Paul Gertler; Marco Gonzalez-Navarro; Simeon Nichter
Abstract: This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens’ participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. Second, we exploit rainfall shocks. We find that reducing vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism.
Keywords: clientelism; economic vulnerability; political behavior; randomized control trial
JEL Codes: O11; O12; O54; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Rainfall shocks (Q54) | Increase in requests for private goods from politicians (H49) |
| Requests for private goods from politicians (H42) | Likelihood of voting for the incumbent mayor (D79) |
| Reducing vulnerability through the cisterns intervention (Q25) | Decrease in requests for private goods from politicians (D72) |
| Reducing vulnerability through the cisterns intervention (Q25) | Decrease in likelihood of voting for the incumbent mayor (D79) |