Institutional Investors and Information Acquisition: Implications for Asset Prices and Informational Efficiency

Working Paper: NBER ID: w23561

Authors: Matthijs Breugem; Adrian Buss

Abstract: We jointly model the information choice and portfolio allocation problem of institutional investors who are concerned about their performance relative to a benchmark. Benchmarking increases an investor's effective risk-aversion, which reduces his willingness to speculate and, consequently, his desire to acquire information. In equilibrium, an increase in the fraction of benchmarked institutional investors leads to a decline in price informativeness, which can cause a decline in the prices of all risky assets and the market portfolio. The decline in price informativeness also leads to a substantial increase in return volatilities and allows non-benchmarked investors to substantially outperformed benchmarked investors.

Keywords: institutional investors; information acquisition; asset prices; informational efficiency

JEL Codes: G11; G14; G23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Increase in the fraction of benchmarked institutional investors (G23)Decline in price informativeness (G14)
Decline in price informativeness (G14)Decline in prices of non-index stocks (G19)
Increase in the fraction of benchmarked institutional investors (G23)Decline in prices of all risky assets (G19)
Decline in price informativeness (G14)Higher return volatility for all stocks (G17)
Increase in the fraction of benchmarked institutional investors (G23)Negative impact on performance of benchmarked investors (G41)

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