Working Paper: NBER ID: w23098
Authors: Raymond Fisman; Yongxiang Wang
Abstract: We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of ‘death ceilings’ that, if exceeded, would impede government officials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal officials experienced larger declines in accidental deaths, suggesting complementarities between incentives at different levels of government. While realized accidental deaths predict the following year's ceiling, we observe no evidence that provinces manipulate deaths upward to avoid ratchet effects in the setting of death ceilings.
Keywords: Incentives; Government; Bureaucracy; Safety; Manipulation
JEL Codes: D73; H75
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Implementation of the death ceiling program in 2004 (H69) | Manipulation of reported accidental deaths (I12) |
| No Safety No Promotion laws (J28) | Reduction in accidental deaths (J28) |
| Manipulation of reported accidental deaths (I12) | Concentration of reported deaths around the ceiling value (Y10) |
| Lack of upward manipulation of reported deaths (I12) | No inflation of reported deaths to secure favorable ceilings (E31) |