Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in US Electricity Generation

Working Paper: NBER ID: w23053

Authors: Steve Cicala

Abstract: This paper measures changes in electricity generation costs caused by the introduction of market mechanisms to determine output decisions in service areas that were previously using command-and-control-type operations. I use the staggered transition to markets from 1999- 2012 to evaluate the causal impact of liberalization using a nationwide panel of hourly data on electricity demand and unit-level costs, capacities, and output. To address the potentially confounding effects of unrelated fuel price changes, I use machine learning methods to predict the allocation of output to generating units in the absence of markets for counterfactual production patterns. I find that markets reduce production costs by $3B per year by reallocating output among existing power plants: Gains from trade across service areas increase by 20% based on a 10% increase in traded electricity, and costs from using uneconomical units fall 20% from a 10% reduction in their operation.

Keywords: electricity generation; market mechanisms; production costs; regulatory frameworks

JEL Codes: D4; D61; L1; L5; L94; Q4


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
introduction of market mechanisms (D47)production costs (D24)
reallocation of output among existing power plants (L94)traded electricity (L94)
reallocation of output among existing power plants (L94)costs associated with uneconomical units (M41)
market-based dispatch (D47)gains from trade (F11)
market mechanisms (D47)market efficiency (G14)
introduction of market mechanisms (D47)efficiency in reallocating resources (D61)

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