Working Paper: NBER ID: w22806
Authors: Matthieu Chavaz; Andrew K. Rose
Abstract: We use spatial discontinuities associated with congressional district borders to identify the effect of political influences on American banks’ lending. We show that recipients of the 2008 public capital injection program (TARP) increased mortgage and small business lending by 23% to 60% more in areas located inside their home-representative’s district than elsewhere. The impact is stronger if the representative supported the TARP in Congress, was subsequently re-elected, and received more political contributions from the financial industry. Together, these results suggest that political considerations influence credit allocation in a politically mature system like the United States without the formal possibility of political interference in lending decisions, and that this influence is larger if the flows between banks and politicians are reciprocal.
Keywords: bank lending; political influences; TARP; congressional districts
JEL Codes: F36; G28
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| TARP (E63) | mortgage lending (G21) |
| support for TARP (H81) | mortgage lending (G21) |
| TARP participation (G28) | lending behavior (G21) |
| home district effect (R20) | mortgage lending (G21) |
| political connections (D72) | mortgage lending (G21) |