Working Paper: NBER ID: w22768
Authors: Josh Lerner; Haris Tabakovic; Jean Tirole
Abstract: A key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms’ strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements—in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP—and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.
Keywords: patent disclosures; standard-setting; intellectual property; FRAND licensing; SSOs
JEL Codes: L24; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| downstream presence (L95) | generic disclosures (G28) |
| patent quality (L15) | specific disclosures (G28) |