Working Paper: NBER ID: w22559
Authors: Jane Arnold Lincove; Kalena E. Cortes
Abstract: We examine the role of information in the college matching behavior of low- and high-income students, exploiting a state automatic admissions policy that provides some students with perfect a priori certainty of college admissions. We find that admissions certainty encourages college-ready low-income students to seek more rigorous universities. Low-income students who are less college-ready are not influenced by admissions certainty and are sensitive to college entrance exams scores. Most students also prefer campuses with students of similar race, income, and high school class rank, but only highly-qualified low-income students choose institutions where they have fewer same-race and same-income peers.
Keywords: college matching behavior; automatic admissions; low-income students; high-income students; information asymmetry
JEL Codes: I21; I23; J15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| admissions certainty (D81) | college-ready low-income students apply to more rigorous universities (I23) |
| admissions certainty (D81) | undermatching behavior of low-income students (I24) |
| admissions certainty (D81) | application to closely matched schools (I23) |
| college readiness (A21) | undermatching sensitivity of low-income students (I24) |
| high SAT scores (I24) | application behavior of low-income students (I24) |
| admissions certainty (D81) | enrollment decisions of low-income students (I24) |