Working Paper: NBER ID: w22526
Authors: Daniel B. Jones; Randall Walsh
Abstract: How does the partisan composition of an electorate impact the policies adopted by an elected representative? We take advantage of variation in the partisan composition of Congressional districts stemming from Census-initiated redistricting in the 1990’s, 2000’s, and 2010’s. Using this variation, we examine how an increase in Democrat share within a district impacts the district representative’s roll call voting. We find that an increase in Democrat share within a district causes more leftist roll call voting. This occurs because a Democrat is more likely to hold the seat, but also because – in contrast to existing empirical work – partisan composition has a direct effect on the roll call voting of individual representatives. This is true of both Democrats and Republicans. It is also true regardless of the nature of the redistricting (e.g., whether the redistricting was generated by a partisan or non-partisan process).
Keywords: voter preferences; redistricting; legislative behavior; partisan composition
JEL Codes: D72; H0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increase in the democrat share within a congressional district (D72) | more leftist roll call voting by the district's representative (D72) |
| increase in the democrat share within a congressional district (D72) | increased likelihood of electing a Democrat (K16) |
| increased likelihood of electing a Democrat (K16) | more leftist roll call voting by the district's representative (D72) |
| increase in the democrat share within a congressional district (D72) | individual representatives adjust their voting behavior in response to changes in their district's partisan composition (D72) |