Working Paper: NBER ID: w22221
Authors: Mitchell Hoffman; Gianmarco Leon; Mara Lombardi
Abstract: We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949-2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and be uninformed.
Keywords: compulsory voting; voter turnout; government spending; Austria
JEL Codes: D72; H10; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Compulsory voting laws (K16) | Voter turnout (K16) |
| Compulsory voting laws (K16) | Parliamentary election turnout (D72) |
| Compulsory voting laws (K16) | State election turnout (K16) |
| Compulsory voting laws (K16) | Presidential election turnout (K16) |
| Voter turnout (K16) | Government spending patterns (H50) |
| Voter turnout (K16) | Electoral outcomes (K16) |
| Newly mobilized voters (K16) | Political landscape (D72) |
| Nonpartisan, less informed, low interest voters (D72) | Influence on median voter (D79) |