Working Paper: NBER ID: w22220
Authors: Mark J. McCabe; Christopher M. Snyder
Abstract: The move from traditional to open-access journals—which charge no subscription fees, only submission fees—is gaining support in academia. We analyze a two-sided-market model in which journals cannot commit to subscription fees when authors (who prefer low subscription fees because this boosts readership) make submission decisions. This leads to a hold-up problem, manifested as excessive subscription fees. Open access is a crude attempt to avoid hold up by eliminating subscription fees. We compare the efficiency and profitability of traditional versus open access under various market structures (monopoly, Bertrand competition) and extensions (non-profit journals, bundling, hybrid pricing), using our theoretical findings to understand the evolution of the market for academic journals in the Internet age.
Keywords: Open Access; Academic Journals; Two-Sided Market; Holdup Problem
JEL Codes: D40; L14; L31; L82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| traditional journals face a holdup problem (C44) | excessive subscription fees (D45) |
| traditional journals face a holdup problem (C44) | reduced readership (Y50) |
| high subscription fees deter authors from submitting to traditional journals (A19) | authors prefer journals that maintain low fees (A19) |
| open access (L17) | zero subscription fees (D49) |
| open access (L17) | attract more authors (Y70) |
| open access (L17) | potentially increase overall readership (Y90) |
| open access alleviates the holdup problem (D86) | higher submission fees (D40) |
| open access alleviates the holdup problem (D86) | does not guarantee increased social welfare (D69) |