Working Paper: NBER ID: w22166
Authors: Sebastian Galiani; Ivan Lopez Cruz; Gustavo Torrens
Abstract: This paper develops a model of the geographic distribution of crime in an urban area. When the police protect some neighborhoods (concentrated protection), the city becomes segregated. When the police are evenly deployed across the city (dispersed protection), an integrated city emerges. Unequal societies face a difficult dilemma in that concentrated protection maximizes aggregate welfare but exacerbates social disparities. Taxes and subsidies that can be employed to offset the disadvantages to agents left unprotected. Private security makes an integrated city less likely. Even under dispersed public protection, rich agents may use private security to endogenously isolate themselves in closed neighborhoods.
Keywords: Policy; Deployment; Crime; Spatial Equilibrium; Inequality
JEL Codes: K42; R12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Police protection allocation (H56) | Crime rates (K42) |
| Concentrated police protection (K42) | Spatial segregation (R23) |
| Wealth concentration in safe neighborhoods (D30) | Spatial segregation (R23) |
| Dispersed police protection (P14) | Equalized crime rates (K14) |
| Dispersed police protection (P14) | Equalized income levels (D31) |
| Concentrated police protection (K42) | High housing prices in protected neighborhoods (R28) |
| Concentrated police protection (K42) | Low housing prices in unprotected neighborhoods (R31) |
| Concentrated police protection (K42) | Higher aggregate welfare in high wage-income societies (D69) |
| Dispersed police protection (P14) | Higher aggregate welfare in equalitarian societies (D69) |
| Socioeconomic distribution of agents (D39) | Crime rates (K42) |