Dynamic Optimization in Two-Party Models

Working Paper: NBER ID: w2213

Authors: Warwick McKibbin; Nouriel Roubini; Jeffrey Sachs

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to study the problem of optimal dynamic policy formulation with competing political parties. We study a general class of problems, in which the two competing political parties have quadratic intertemporal objective functions, and in which the economy has a linear structure and a multidimensional state space. For the general linear quadratic problem we develop a numerical dynamic programming algorithm to solve for optimal policies of each party taking into account the party's objectives; the structure of the economy ; the probability of future election results; and the objectives of the other political party.

Keywords: dynamic optimization; political parties; macroeconomic policy

JEL Codes: D72; E61


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Party affiliation (D72)Macroeconomic policy outcomes (E60)
Probability of reelection (D79)Inflationary behavior of parties (E31)
Current inflation rates (E31)Expected utility for political parties (D79)
Expected utility for political parties (D79)Future policy decisions (D78)

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