Working Paper: NBER ID: w2211
Authors: David E. Bloom; Christopher L. Cavanagh
Abstract: The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behavior of arbitrators under alternative forms of arbitration. This article suggests that it is natural for empirical economists to now expand their focus to include issues related to the behavior of negotiators. In this connection, three key aspects of negotiator behavior are discussed: (1) the decision to settle a dispute voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration; (2) the strategy for selecting an arbitrator; and (3) the final bargaining position to advance before an arbitrator.
Keywords: arbitration; negotiator behavior; dispute resolution
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| expectations about arbitrator behavior (K41) | arbitration usage (J52) |
| contract zone (R38) | voluntary settlement (J65) |
| direct negotiation costs and uncertainty (D80) | voluntary settlement (J65) |
| negotiators' strategic behavior (C78) | outcomes of arbitrator selection (J52) |
| perceptions of arbitrator preferences (K41) | final positions negotiators take in arbitration (J52) |