Working Paper: NBER ID: w22072
Authors: Matthias Doepke; Fabian Kindermann
Abstract: It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.
Keywords: fertility; household bargaining; childcare policy; parental agreement
JEL Codes: J13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Disagreement over additional children (at higher parities) (J12) | More critical impact on fertility (J13) |
| More equitable sharing of childcare responsibilities (D13) | Higher fertility rates (J13) |
| Parental agreement on fertility preferences (J13) | Actual fertility outcomes (J13) |
| Disagreement on having another child (J12) | Lower birth probabilities (J19) |
| Female partner's desire for a child (when male does not) (J12) | Lower likelihood of having a baby (J13) |
| Distribution of childcare responsibilities (D13) | Fertility decisions (J13) |