Working Paper: NBER ID: w22019
Authors: James Andreoni; Michael Callen; Muhammad Yasir Khan; Karrar Jaffar; Charles Sprenger
Abstract: We use estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for polio vaccinators in Lahore, Pakistan. We measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of effort, and use these estimates to construct individually-tailored incentives. We evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to discounting parameters in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. Our tailored policy is compared to alternatives that either rely on atheoretic reduced-form relationships for policy guidance or apply the same policy to all individuals. We find that contracts tailored to individual discounting outperform this range of policy alternatives.
Keywords: Time Preferences; Vaccination; Incentives; Polio; Tailored Contracts
JEL Codes: D03; I1; O1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| tailored incentives based on time preference estimates (D15) | vaccination behavior improvement (C92) |
| tailored incentives outperform broad policy alternatives (H73) | vaccination behavior improvement (C92) |
| heterogeneity in time preferences among LHWs (J29) | vaccination behavior improvement (I12) |
| present bias enhances efficacy of tailored incentives (D91) | vaccination behavior improvement (C92) |
| structural tailored policy considering present bias (D15) | vaccination allocation improvement (I14) |