Working Paper: NBER ID: w21953
Authors: Anthony Heyes; John A. List
Abstract: There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination.
Keywords: discrimination; trust game; self-revelation; economic behavior
JEL Codes: C9; C91; D03; J71; J78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| self-revelation (D80) | partner behavior (L14) |
| self-revelation (D80) | willingness to pay (D11) |
| role (A11) | self-revelation (D80) |
| price (D41) | self-revelation (D80) |