Working Paper: NBER ID: w21798
Authors: Sara Lowes; Nathan Nunn; James A. Robinson; Jonathan Weigel
Abstract: We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force and military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule-following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain.
Keywords: Culture; Institutions; Economic Development; Kuba Kingdom
JEL Codes: D03; N47
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Centralized formal institutions in the Kuba Kingdom (D73) | Weaker norms of rule-following (P37) |
| Centralized formal institutions in the Kuba Kingdom (D73) | Greater propensity to cheat for material gain (Z13) |
| Presence of a centralized state (H10) | Deterioration in rule-following behavior (D91) |
| Kuba descendants (N96) | Less likely to follow rules (K40) |
| Kuba descendants (N96) | Allocate less to others in resource allocation games (C71) |
| Kuba descendants (N96) | Higher rates of theft in ultimatum games (C72) |