Working Paper: NBER ID: w21765
Authors: John M. De Figueiredo; Edward H. Stiglitz
Abstract: This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K0; K23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| agency rulemaking (K23) | voter preferences (K16) |
| delegation of authority to unelected bureaucrats (D73) | outcomes that diverge from median voter preferences (D72) |
| influence of interest groups (D72) | regulatory process (L51) |
| lobbying pressures (D72) | preferences of regulatory agencies (K23) |
| presidential control over agencies (D73) | democratic accountability in rulemaking (D72) |