Working Paper: NBER ID: w21540
Authors: Sharun Mukand; Dani Rodrik
Abstract: We distinguish between three sets of rights – property rights, political rights, and civil rights – and provide a taxonomy of political regimes. The distinctive nature of liberal democracy is that it protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Democratic transitions are typically the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights). Such settlements rarely produce liberal democracy, as the minority has neither the resources nor the numbers to make a contribution at the bargaining table. We develop a formal model to sharpen the contrast between electoral and liberal democracies and highlight circumstances under which liberal democracy can emerge. We discuss informally the difference between social mobilizations sparked by industrialization and decolonization. Since the latter revolve around identity cleavages rather than class cleavages, they are less conducive to liberal politics.
Keywords: Liberal Democracy; Political Economy; Civil Rights; Electoral Democracy
JEL Codes: P48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political logic of democratization (D72) | provision of property and political rights (P14) |
| political logic of democratization (D72) | neglect of civil rights (K42) |
| majority's interests in public goods (H40) | neglect of minority rights (J15) |
| political settlements favoring majority (D72) | failure to protect minority rights (P14) |
| alignment of identity cleavages and economic interests of elites (F55) | emergence of liberal democracy (P16) |
| absence of civil rights (P14) | electoral regimes devolving into authoritarianism (O17) |