Working Paper: NBER ID: w21289
Authors: Christopher Blattman; Jeannie Annan
Abstract: States and aid agencies use employment programs to rehabilitate high-risk men in the belief that peaceful work opportunities will deter them from crime and violence. Rigorous evidence is rare. We experimentally evaluate a program of agricultural training, capital inputs, and counseling for Liberian ex-fighters who were illegally mining or occupying rubber plantations. 14 months after the program ended, men who accepted the program offer increased their farm employment and profits, and shifted work hours away from illicit activities. Men also reduced interest in mercenary work in a nearby war. Finally, some men did not receive their capital inputs but expected a future cash transfer instead, and they reduced illicit and mercenary activities most of all. The evidence suggests that illicit and mercenary labor supply responds to small changes in returns to peaceful work, especially future and ongoing incentives. But the impacts of training alone, without capital, appear to be low.
Keywords: employment programs; lawlessness; rebellion; high-risk men; fragile states; Liberia
JEL Codes: C93; D74; J21; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| employment interventions (J68) | lawlessness (K40) |
| employment interventions (J68) | rebellion (D74) |
| agricultural training program + capital inputs (Q12) | lawful employment (K31) |
| capital inputs (E22) | illicit activities (K42) |
| expected future cash transfer (F16) | illicit activities (K42) |
| agricultural training alone (Q19) | behavior (C92) |
| small changes in returns to peaceful work (J29) | illicit labor supply (J46) |