Working Paper: NBER ID: w21143
Authors: Bralind Kiri; Nicola Lacetera; Lorenzo Zirulia
Abstract: We elaborate a model of the incentives of scientists to perform activities of control and criticism when these activities, just like the production of novel findings, are costly, and we study the strategic interaction between these incentives. We then use the model to assess policies meant to enhance the reliability of scientific knowledge. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality science characterizes all the equilibria in the basic model. In fact, the absence of detected low-quality research can be interpreted as the lack of verification activities and thus as a potential limitation to the reliability of a field. Incentivizing incremental research and verification activities improves the expected quality of research; this effect, however, is contrasted by the incentives to free ride on performing verification if many scientists are involved, and may discourage scientists to undertake new research in the first place. Finally, softening incentives to publish does not enhance quality, although it increases the fraction of detected low-quality papers. We also advance empirical predictions and discuss the insights for firms and investors as they "scout" the scientific landscape.
Keywords: scientific production; verification; research quality; publish or perish
JEL Codes: L31; O31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Low verification incentives (D82) | Low-quality research being produced (D29) |
| Increased incentives for verification (O31) | Enhanced quality of research (C90) |
| Size of the scientific community (C90) | Dilution of individual incentives for verification (C91) |
| Dilution of individual incentives for verification (C91) | Lower overall research quality (D29) |
| Absence of low-quality research (C90) | Lack of verification (D82) |
| Incentivizing verification activities (O31) | Improved expected quality of research (C90) |
| Softening publication incentives (L17) | Increased identification of low-quality papers (L15) |
| Softening publication incentives (L17) | No improvement in research quality (C59) |